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Let us examine what the memory image of this process would look like if we were to input 160 spaces into our little program before hitting return.
Obviously more malicious input can be devised to execute actual compiled instructions (such as exec(/bin/sh)).
Avoiding Buffer Overflows
The most straightforward solution to the problem of stack-overflows is to always use length restricted memory and string copy functions. `strncpy` and `strncat` are part of the standard C library. These functions accept a length value as a parameter which should be no larger than the size of the destination buffer. These functions will then copy up to 'length' bytes from the source to the destination. However there are a number of problems with these functions. Neither function guarantees NUL termination if the size of the input buffer is as large as the destination. The length parameter is also used inconsistently between strncpy and strncat so it is easy for programmers to get confused as to their proper usage. There is also a significant performance loss compared to `strcpy` when copying a short string into a large buffer since `strncpy` NUL fills up the size specified.
Another memory copy implementation exists to get around these problems. The `strlcpy` and `strlcat` functions guarantee that they will always null terminate the destination string when given a non-zero length argument.
Compiler based run-time bounds checking
Unfortunately there is still a very large assortment of code in public use which blindly copies memory around without using any of the bounded copy routines we just discussed. Fortunately, there is a way to help prevent such attacks - run-time bounds checking, which is implemented by several C/C++ compilers.
ProPolice is one such compiler feature, and is integrated into man:gcc[1] versions 4.1 and later. It replaces and extends the earlier StackGuard man:gcc[1] extension.
ProPolice helps to protect against stack-based buffer overflows and other attacks by laying pseudo-random numbers in key areas of the stack before calling any function. When a function returns, these "canaries" are checked and if they are found to have been changed the executable is immediately aborted. Thus any attempt to modify the return address or other variable stored on the stack in an attempt to get malicious code to run is unlikely to succeed, as the attacker would have to also manage to leave the pseudo-random canaries untouched.
Recompiling your application with ProPolice is an effective means of stopping most buffer-overflow attacks, but it can still be compromised.
Library based run-time bounds checking
Compiler-based mechanisms are completely useless for binary-only software for which you cannot recompile. For these situations there are a number of libraries which re-implement the unsafe functions of the C-library (`strcpy`, `fscanf`, `getwd`, etc..) and ensure that these functions can never write past the stack pointer.
libsafe
libverify
libparanoia
Unfortunately these library-based defenses have a number of shortcomings. These libraries only protect against a very small set of security related issues and they neglect to fix the actual problem. These defenses may fail if the application was compiled with -fomit-frame-pointer. Also, the LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variables can be overwritten/unset by the user.
SetUID issues
There are at least 6 different IDs associated with any given process, and you must therefore be very careful with the access that your process has at any given time. In particular, all seteuid applications should give up their privileges as soon as it is no longer required.
The real user ID can only be changed by a superuser process. The login program sets this when a user initially logs in and it is seldom changed.
The effective user ID is set by the `exec()` functions if a program has its seteuid bit set. An application can call `seteuid()` at any time to set the effective user ID to either the real user ID or the saved set-user-ID. When the effective user ID is set by `exec()` functions, the previous value is saved in the saved set-user-ID.