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Translation

#include <sys/kernel.h>

void foo_cleanup(void *unused)
{
foo_kill();
}
SYSUNINIT(foobar, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_cleanup, NULL);

struct foo_stack foo_stack = {
FOO_STACK_VOODOO;
}

void foo_flush(void *vdata)
{
}
SYSUNINIT(barfoo, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_flush, &foo_stack);
(itstool) path: example/programlisting
English
#include <sys/kernel.h>

void foo_cleanup(void *unused)
{
foo_kill();
}
SYSUNINIT(foobar, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_cleanup, NULL);

struct foo_stack foo_stack = {
FOO_STACK_VOODOO;
}

void foo_flush(void *vdata)
{
}
SYSUNINIT(barfoo, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_flush, &foo_stack);
316/3140 · 314
Context English Portuguese (Brazil) State
<primary>pseudo-devices</primary> <primary> pseudo-dispositivos </primary>
There are currently two uses for SYSINIT. Function dispatch at system startup and kernel module loads, and function dispatch at system shutdown and kernel module unload. Kernel subsystems often use system startup SYSINIT's to initialize data structures, for example the process scheduling subsystem uses a SYSINIT to initialize the run queue data structure. Device drivers should avoid using <literal>SYSINIT()</literal> directly. Instead drivers for real devices that are part of a bus structure should use <literal>DRIVER_MODULE()</literal> to provide a function that detects the device and, if it is present, initializes the device. It will do a few things specific to devices and then call <literal>SYSINIT()</literal> itself. For pseudo-devices, which are not part of a bus structure, use <literal>DEV_MODULE()</literal>. Existem atualmente dois usos para SYSINIT. O despacho de fun��es na inicializa��o do sistema e do m�dulo kernel e o envio de fun��es no desligamento do sistema e no m�dulo kernel descarregam. Os subsistemas Kernel geralmente usam SYSINIT';s para inicializar estruturas de dados, por exemplo, o subsistema de agendamento de processos SYSINIT para inicializar a estrutura de dados da fila de execu��o.Os drivers de dispositivo devem evitar o uso <literal> SYSINIT () </literal> diretamente. Em vez disso, os drivers para dispositivos reais que fazem parte de uma estrutura de barramento devem usar <literal> DRIVER_MODULE () </literal> para fornecer uma fun��o que detecta o dispositivo e, se estiver presente, inicializa o dispositivo. Ele far� algumas coisas espec�ficas para os dispositivos e, em seguida, chamar� <literal> SYSINIT () </literal> em si. Para pseudo-dispositivos, que n�o fazem parte de uma estrutura de barramento, use <literal> DEV_MODULE () </literal>
Using SYSINIT Usando SYSINIT
&lt;sys/kernel.h&gt; &lt;sys/kernel.h&gt;
SYSINIT(uniquifier, subsystem, order, func, ident)
SYSUNINIT(uniquifier, subsystem, order, func, ident) 		SYSINIT(uniquifier, subsystem, order, func, ident)
SYSUNINIT(uniquifier, subsystem, order, func, ident)
Startup Comece
The <literal>SYSINIT()</literal> macro creates the necessary SYSINIT data in SYSINIT's startup data set for SYSINIT to sort and dispatch a function at system startup and module load. <literal>SYSINIT()</literal> takes a uniquifier that SYSINIT uses to identify the particular function dispatch data, the subsystem order, the subsystem element order, the function to call, and the data to pass the function. All functions must take a constant pointer argument. O <literal> SYSINIT () </literal> macro cria os dados SYSINIT necess�rios no conjunto de dados de inicializa��o do SYSINIT para SYSINIT para classificar e despachar uma fun��o na inicializa��o do sistema e no carregamento do m�dulo. <literal> SYSINIT () </literal> pega um uniquificador que SYSINIT usa para identificar os dados de despacho da fun��o espec�fica, a ordem do subsistema, a ordem do elemento do subsistema, a fun��o a ser chamada e os dados para passar a fun��o. Todas as fun��es devem ter um argumento de ponteiro constante.
Example of a <literal>SYSINIT()</literal> Exemplo de um <literal> SYSINIT () </literal>
#include &lt;sys/kernel.h&gt;

void foo_null(void *unused)
{
foo_doo();
}
SYSINIT(foo, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_null, NULL);

struct foo foo_voodoo = {
FOO_VOODOO;
}

void foo_arg(void *vdata)
{
struct foo *foo = (struct foo *)vdata;
foo_data(foo);
}
SYSINIT(bar, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_arg, &amp;foo_voodoo); 		#include &lt;sys/kernel.h&gt;

void foo_null(void *unused)
{
foo_doo();
}
SYSINIT(foo, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_null, NULL);

struct foo foo_voodoo = {
FOO_VOODOO;
}

void foo_arg(void *vdata)
{
struct foo *foo = (struct foo *)vdata;
foo_data(foo);
}
SYSINIT(bar, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_arg, &amp;foo_voodoo);
Note that <literal>SI_SUB_FOO</literal> and <literal>SI_ORDER_FOO</literal> need to be in the <literal>sysinit_sub_id</literal> and <literal>sysinit_elem_order</literal> enum's as mentioned above. Either use existing ones or add your own to the enum's. You can also use math for fine-tuning the order a SYSINIT will run in. This example shows a SYSINIT that needs to be run just barely before the SYSINIT's that handle tuning kernel parameters. Observe que <literal> SI_SUB_FOO </literal> e <literal> SI_ORDER_FOO </literal> precisa estar no <literal> sysinit_sub_id </literal> e <literal> sysinit_elem_order </literal> enum como mencionado acima. Use os existentes ou adicione os seus aos do enum. Voc� tamb�m pode usar matem�tica para ajustar a ordem na qual um SYSINIT ser� executado. Este exemplo mostra um SYSINIT que precisa ser executado logo antes do SYSINIT tratar os par�metros do kernel de ajuste.
Example of Adjusting <literal>SYSINIT()</literal> Order Exemplo de ajuste <literal> SYSINIT () </literal> Ordem
static void
mptable_register(void *dummy __unused)
{

apic_register_enumerator(&amp;mptable_enumerator);
}

SYSINIT(mptable_register, SI_SUB_TUNABLES - 1, SI_ORDER_FIRST,
mptable_register, NULL); 		static void
mptable_register(void *dummy __unused)
{

apic_register_enumerator(&amp;mptable_enumerator);
}

SYSINIT(mptable_register, SI_SUB_TUNABLES - 1, SI_ORDER_FIRST,
mptable_register, NULL);
Shutdown Desligar
The <literal>SYSUNINIT()</literal> macro behaves similarly to the <literal>SYSINIT()</literal> macro except that it adds the SYSINIT data to SYSINIT's shutdown data set. O <literal> SYSUNINIT () </literal> macro se comporta de forma semelhante ao <literal> SYSINIT () </literal> macro, exceto que adiciona os dados SYSINIT ao conjunto de dados de desligamento do SYSINIT.
Example of a <literal>SYSUNINIT()</literal> Exemplo de um <literal> SYSUNINIT () </literal>
#include &lt;sys/kernel.h&gt;

void foo_cleanup(void *unused)
{
foo_kill();
}
SYSUNINIT(foobar, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_cleanup, NULL);

struct foo_stack foo_stack = {
FOO_STACK_VOODOO;
}

void foo_flush(void *vdata)
{
}
SYSUNINIT(barfoo, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_flush, &amp;foo_stack); 		#include &lt;sys/kernel.h&gt;

void foo_cleanup(void *unused)
{
foo_kill();
}
SYSUNINIT(foobar, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_cleanup, NULL);

struct foo_stack foo_stack = {
FOO_STACK_VOODOO;
}

void foo_flush(void *vdata)
{
}
SYSUNINIT(barfoo, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_flush, &amp;foo_stack);
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework O framework MAC TrustedBSD

<email>chris@FreeBSD.org</email>
 		<email>chris@FreeBSD.org</email>
<personname> <firstname>Chris</firstname> <surname>Costello</surname> </personname> <affiliation> <orgname>TrustedBSD Project</orgname> <_:address-1/> </affiliation> <personname><firstname> Chris </firstname><surname> Costello </surname></personname><affiliation><orgname> Projeto TrustedBSD </orgname> <_: endere�o-1 /> </affiliation>

<email>rwatson@FreeBSD.org</email>
 		<email>rwatson@FreeBSD.org</email>
<personname> <firstname>Robert</firstname> <surname>Watson</surname> </personname> <affiliation> <orgname>TrustedBSD Project</orgname> <_:address-1/> </affiliation> <personname><firstname> Robert </firstname><surname> Watson </surname></personname><affiliation><orgname> Projeto TrustedBSD </orgname> <_: endere�o-1 /> </affiliation>
MAC Documentation Copyright Direitos autorais da documenta��o do MAC
This documentation was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (<quote>CBOSS</quote>), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. Esta documenta��o foi desenvolvida para o Projeto FreeBSD por Chris Costello na Safeport Network Services e Network Associates Laboratories, a Divis�o de Pesquisa de Seguran�a da Network Associates, Inc. sob contrato DARPA / SPAWAR N66001-01-C-8035 ( <quote> CBOSS </quote> ), como parte do programa de pesquisa DARPA CHATS.
Redistribution and use in source (SGML DocBook) and 'compiled' forms (SGML, HTML, PDF, PostScript, RTF and so forth) with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: Redistribui��o e uso em formul�rios de origem (SGML DocBook) e ';compilados'; (SGML, HTML, PDF, PostScript, RTF e assim por diante) com ou sem modifica��o, s�o permitidos desde que as seguintes condi��es sejam atendidas:
Redistributions of source code (SGML DocBook) must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer as the first lines of this file unmodified. As redistribui��es do c�digo-fonte (SGML DocBook) devem manter o aviso de copyright acima, esta lista de condi��es e o aviso de isen��o de responsabilidade a seguir, conforme as primeiras linhas deste arquivo n�o sejam modificadas.
THIS DOCUMENTATION IS PROVIDED BY THE NETWORKS ASSOCIATES TECHNOLOGY, INC "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL NETWORKS ASSOCIATES TECHNOLOGY, INC BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS DOCUMENTATION, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ESTA DOCUMENTA��O � FORNECIDA PELA NETWORKS ASSOCIATES TECHNOLOGY, INC " COMO EST� "" E QUALQUER GARANTIA EXPRESSA OU IMPL�CITA, INCLUINDO, MAS N�O SE LIMITANDO �S GARANTIAS IMPL�CITAS DE COMERCIALIZA��O E ADEQUA��O A UMA FINALIDADE ESPEC�FICA, � REJEITADA. A NETWORKS ASSOCIATES TECHNOLOGY, INC � RESPONS�VEL POR QUAISQUER DANOS DIRETOS, INDIRETOS, INCIDENTAIS, ESPECIAIS, EXEMPLARES OU CONSEQ�ENCIAIS (INCLUINDO, MAS N�O SE LIMITANDO A, AQUISI��O DE BENS OU SERVI�OS SUBSTITUTOS; PERDA DE USO, DADOS OU LUCROS; OU INTERRUP��O DE NEG�CIOS) SEMPRE CAUSOU QUALQUER TEORIA DE RESPONSABILIDADE, SEJA EM CONTRATO, RESPONSABILIDADE ESTRITA, OU DELITO (INCLUINDO NEGLIG�NCIA OU DE OUTRA FORMA) DECORRENTE DE QUALQUER FORMA DO USO DESTA DOCUMENTA��O, MESMO SE AVISADA DA POSSIBILIDADE DE TAIS DANOS.
FreeBSD includes experimental support for several mandatory access control policies, as well as a framework for kernel security extensibility, the TrustedBSD MAC Framework. The MAC Framework is a pluggable access control framework, permitting new security policies to be easily linked into the kernel, loaded at boot, or loaded dynamically at run-time. The framework provides a variety of features to make it easier to implement new security policies, including the ability to easily tag security labels (such as confidentiality information) onto system objects. O FreeBSD inclui suporte experimental para v�rias pol�ticas de controle de acesso, bem como uma estrutura para extensibilidade de seguran�a do kernel, o TrustedBSD MAC Framework. O MAC Framework � uma estrutura de controle de acesso plug�vel, permitindo que novas pol�ticas de seguran�a sejam facilmente vinculadas ao kernel na inicializa��o ou carregada dinamicamente em tempo de execu��o. A estrutura fornece uma variedade de recursos para facilitar a implementa��o de novas pol�ticas de seguran�a, incluindo a capacidade de marcar facilmente r�tulos de seguran�a (como informa��es de confidencialidade) em objetos do sistema.
This chapter introduces the MAC policy framework and provides documentation for a sample MAC policy module. Este cap�tulo apresenta a estrutura de pol�tica do MAC e fornece documenta��o para um m�dulo de pol�tica MAC de amostra.
Introduction Introdução
The TrustedBSD MAC framework provides a mechanism to allow the compile-time or run-time extension of the kernel access control model. New system policies may be implemented as kernel modules and linked to the kernel; if multiple policy modules are present, their results will be composed. The MAC Framework provides a variety of access control infrastructure services to assist policy writers, including support for transient and persistent policy-agnostic object security labels. This support is currently considered experimental. A estrutura MAC do TrustedBSD fornece um mecanismo para permitir a extens�o em tempo de compila��o ou de tempo de execu��o do modelo de controle de acesso do kernel. Novas pol�ticas do sistema podem ser implementadas como m�dulos do kernel e vinculadas ao kernel; se houver v�rios m�dulos de pol�tica, seus resultados O MAC Framework fornece uma variedade de servi�os de infra-estrutura de controle de acesso para auxiliar os redatores de pol�ticas, incluindo o suporte a r�tulos de seguran�a de objetos agn�sticos, transit�rios e persistentes. Esse suporte � atualmente considerado experimental.
This chapter provides information appropriate for developers of policy modules, as well as potential consumers of MAC-enabled environments, to learn about how the MAC Framework supports access control extension of the kernel. Este cap�tulo fornece informa��es apropriadas para desenvolvedores de m�dulos de pol�ticas, bem como potenciais consumidores de ambientes habilitados para MAC, para aprender sobre como o MAC Framework suporta a extens�o de controle de acesso do kernel.

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Source information

Source string comment
(itstool) path: example/programlisting
Flags
no-wrap
Source string location
book.translate.xml:4273
String age
a year ago
Source string age
a year ago
Translation file
books/pt_BR/arch-handbook.po, string 558