FreeBSD Doc (Archived)/books_arch-handbook — Portuguese (Brazil) @ Weblate: This documentation was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris …

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This documentation was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (<quote>CBOSS</quote>), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

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Context	English	Portuguese (Brazil)	State
	Example of a <literal>SYSINIT()</literal>	Exemplo de um <literal> SYSINIT () </literal>
	#include <sys/kernel.h> void foo_null(void unused) { foo_doo(); } SYSINIT(foo, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_null, NULL); struct foo foo_voodoo = { FOO_VOODOO; } void foo_arg(void vdata) { struct foo foo = (struct foo )vdata; foo_data(foo); } SYSINIT(bar, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_arg, &foo_voodoo);	#include <sys/kernel.h> void foo_null(void unused) { foo_doo(); } SYSINIT(foo, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_null, NULL); struct foo foo_voodoo = { FOO_VOODOO; } void foo_arg(void vdata) { struct foo foo = (struct foo )vdata; foo_data(foo); } SYSINIT(bar, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_arg, &foo_voodoo);
	Note that <literal>SI_SUB_FOO</literal> and <literal>SI_ORDER_FOO</literal> need to be in the <literal>sysinit_sub_id</literal> and <literal>sysinit_elem_order</literal> enum's as mentioned above. Either use existing ones or add your own to the enum's. You can also use math for fine-tuning the order a SYSINIT will run in. This example shows a SYSINIT that needs to be run just barely before the SYSINIT's that handle tuning kernel parameters.	Observe que <literal> SI_SUB_FOO </literal> e <literal> SI_ORDER_FOO </literal> precisa estar no <literal> sysinit_sub_id </literal> e <literal> sysinit_elem_order </literal> enum como mencionado acima. Use os existentes ou adicione os seus aos do enum. Voc� tamb�m pode usar matem�tica para ajustar a ordem na qual um SYSINIT ser� executado. Este exemplo mostra um SYSINIT que precisa ser executado logo antes do SYSINIT tratar os par�metros do kernel de ajuste.
	Example of Adjusting <literal>SYSINIT()</literal> Order	Exemplo de ajuste <literal> SYSINIT () </literal> Ordem
	static void mptable_register(void *dummy __unused) { apic_register_enumerator(&mptable_enumerator); } SYSINIT(mptable_register, SI_SUB_TUNABLES - 1, SI_ORDER_FIRST, mptable_register, NULL);	static void mptable_register(void *dummy __unused) { apic_register_enumerator(&mptable_enumerator); } SYSINIT(mptable_register, SI_SUB_TUNABLES - 1, SI_ORDER_FIRST, mptable_register, NULL);
	Shutdown	Desligar
	The <literal>SYSUNINIT()</literal> macro behaves similarly to the <literal>SYSINIT()</literal> macro except that it adds the SYSINIT data to SYSINIT's shutdown data set.	O <literal> SYSUNINIT () </literal> macro se comporta de forma semelhante ao <literal> SYSINIT () </literal> macro, exceto que adiciona os dados SYSINIT ao conjunto de dados de desligamento do SYSINIT.
	Example of a <literal>SYSUNINIT()</literal>	Exemplo de um <literal> SYSUNINIT () </literal>
	#include <sys/kernel.h> void foo_cleanup(void unused) { foo_kill(); } SYSUNINIT(foobar, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_cleanup, NULL); struct foo_stack foo_stack = { FOO_STACK_VOODOO; } void foo_flush(void vdata) { } SYSUNINIT(barfoo, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_flush, &foo_stack);	#include <sys/kernel.h> void foo_cleanup(void unused) { foo_kill(); } SYSUNINIT(foobar, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_cleanup, NULL); struct foo_stack foo_stack = { FOO_STACK_VOODOO; } void foo_flush(void vdata) { } SYSUNINIT(barfoo, SI_SUB_FOO, SI_ORDER_FOO, foo_flush, &foo_stack);
	The TrustedBSD MAC Framework	O framework MAC TrustedBSD
	<email>chris@FreeBSD.org</email>	<email>chris@FreeBSD.org</email>
	<personname> <firstname>Chris</firstname> <surname>Costello</surname> </personname> <affiliation> <orgname>TrustedBSD Project</orgname> <_:address-1/> </affiliation>	<personname><firstname> Chris </firstname><surname> Costello </surname></personname><affiliation><orgname> Projeto TrustedBSD </orgname> <_: endere�o-1 /> </affiliation>
	<email>rwatson@FreeBSD.org</email>	<email>rwatson@FreeBSD.org</email>
	<personname> <firstname>Robert</firstname> <surname>Watson</surname> </personname> <affiliation> <orgname>TrustedBSD Project</orgname> <_:address-1/> </affiliation>	<personname><firstname> Robert </firstname><surname> Watson </surname></personname><affiliation><orgname> Projeto TrustedBSD </orgname> <_: endere�o-1 /> </affiliation>
	MAC Documentation Copyright	Direitos autorais da documenta��o do MAC
	This documentation was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (<quote>CBOSS</quote>), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.	Esta documenta��o foi desenvolvida para o Projeto FreeBSD por Chris Costello na Safeport Network Services e Network Associates Laboratories, a Divis�o de Pesquisa de Seguran�a da Network Associates, Inc. sob contrato DARPA / SPAWAR N66001-01-C-8035 ( <quote> CBOSS </quote> ), como parte do programa de pesquisa DARPA CHATS.
	Redistribution and use in source (SGML DocBook) and 'compiled' forms (SGML, HTML, PDF, PostScript, RTF and so forth) with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:	Redistribui��o e uso em formul�rios de origem (SGML DocBook) e ';compilados'; (SGML, HTML, PDF, PostScript, RTF e assim por diante) com ou sem modifica��o, s�o permitidos desde que as seguintes condi��es sejam atendidas:
	Redistributions of source code (SGML DocBook) must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer as the first lines of this file unmodified.	As redistribui��es do c�digo-fonte (SGML DocBook) devem manter o aviso de copyright acima, esta lista de condi��es e o aviso de isen��o de responsabilidade a seguir, conforme as primeiras linhas deste arquivo n�o sejam modificadas.
	THIS DOCUMENTATION IS PROVIDED BY THE NETWORKS ASSOCIATES TECHNOLOGY, INC "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL NETWORKS ASSOCIATES TECHNOLOGY, INC BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS DOCUMENTATION, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.	ESTA DOCUMENTA��O � FORNECIDA PELA NETWORKS ASSOCIATES TECHNOLOGY, INC " COMO EST� "" E QUALQUER GARANTIA EXPRESSA OU IMPL�CITA, INCLUINDO, MAS N�O SE LIMITANDO �S GARANTIAS IMPL�CITAS DE COMERCIALIZA��O E ADEQUA��O A UMA FINALIDADE ESPEC�FICA, � REJEITADA. A NETWORKS ASSOCIATES TECHNOLOGY, INC � RESPONS�VEL POR QUAISQUER DANOS DIRETOS, INDIRETOS, INCIDENTAIS, ESPECIAIS, EXEMPLARES OU CONSEQ�ENCIAIS (INCLUINDO, MAS N�O SE LIMITANDO A, AQUISI��O DE BENS OU SERVI�OS SUBSTITUTOS; PERDA DE USO, DADOS OU LUCROS; OU INTERRUP��O DE NEG�CIOS) SEMPRE CAUSOU QUALQUER TEORIA DE RESPONSABILIDADE, SEJA EM CONTRATO, RESPONSABILIDADE ESTRITA, OU DELITO (INCLUINDO NEGLIG�NCIA OU DE OUTRA FORMA) DECORRENTE DE QUALQUER FORMA DO USO DESTA DOCUMENTA��O, MESMO SE AVISADA DA POSSIBILIDADE DE TAIS DANOS.
	FreeBSD includes experimental support for several mandatory access control policies, as well as a framework for kernel security extensibility, the TrustedBSD MAC Framework. The MAC Framework is a pluggable access control framework, permitting new security policies to be easily linked into the kernel, loaded at boot, or loaded dynamically at run-time. The framework provides a variety of features to make it easier to implement new security policies, including the ability to easily tag security labels (such as confidentiality information) onto system objects.	O FreeBSD inclui suporte experimental para v�rias pol�ticas de controle de acesso, bem como uma estrutura para extensibilidade de seguran�a do kernel, o TrustedBSD MAC Framework. O MAC Framework � uma estrutura de controle de acesso plug�vel, permitindo que novas pol�ticas de seguran�a sejam facilmente vinculadas ao kernel na inicializa��o ou carregada dinamicamente em tempo de execu��o. A estrutura fornece uma variedade de recursos para facilitar a implementa��o de novas pol�ticas de seguran�a, incluindo a capacidade de marcar facilmente r�tulos de seguran�a (como informa��es de confidencialidade) em objetos do sistema.
	This chapter introduces the MAC policy framework and provides documentation for a sample MAC policy module.	Este cap�tulo apresenta a estrutura de pol�tica do MAC e fornece documenta��o para um m�dulo de pol�tica MAC de amostra.
	Introduction	Introdução
	The TrustedBSD MAC framework provides a mechanism to allow the compile-time or run-time extension of the kernel access control model. New system policies may be implemented as kernel modules and linked to the kernel; if multiple policy modules are present, their results will be composed. The MAC Framework provides a variety of access control infrastructure services to assist policy writers, including support for transient and persistent policy-agnostic object security labels. This support is currently considered experimental.	A estrutura MAC do TrustedBSD fornece um mecanismo para permitir a extens�o em tempo de compila��o ou de tempo de execu��o do modelo de controle de acesso do kernel. Novas pol�ticas do sistema podem ser implementadas como m�dulos do kernel e vinculadas ao kernel; se houver v�rios m�dulos de pol�tica, seus resultados O MAC Framework fornece uma variedade de servi�os de infra-estrutura de controle de acesso para auxiliar os redatores de pol�ticas, incluindo o suporte a r�tulos de seguran�a de objetos agn�sticos, transit�rios e persistentes. Esse suporte � atualmente considerado experimental.
	This chapter provides information appropriate for developers of policy modules, as well as potential consumers of MAC-enabled environments, to learn about how the MAC Framework supports access control extension of the kernel.	Este cap�tulo fornece informa��es apropriadas para desenvolvedores de m�dulos de pol�ticas, bem como potenciais consumidores de ambientes habilitados para MAC, para aprender sobre como o MAC Framework suporta a extens�o de controle de acesso do kernel.
	Policy Background	Hist�rico da Pol�tica
	Mandatory Access Control (MAC), refers to a set of access control policies that are mandatorily enforced on users by the operating system. MAC policies may be contrasted with Discretionary Access Control (DAC) protections, by which non-administrative users may (at their discretion) protect objects. In traditional UNIX systems, DAC protections include file permissions and access control lists; MAC protections include process controls preventing inter-user debugging and firewalls. A variety of MAC policies have been formulated by operating system designers and security researches, including the Multi-Level Security (MLS) confidentiality policy, the Biba integrity policy, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE), and Type Enforcement (TE). Each model bases decisions on a variety of factors, including user identity, role, and security clearance, as well as security labels on objects representing concepts such as data sensitivity and integrity.	Mandatory Access Control (MAC), refere-se a um conjunto de pol�ticas de controle de acesso impostas obrigatoriamente aos usu�rios pelo sistema operacional. As pol�ticas MAC podem ser contrastadas com as prote��es de Controle de Acesso Discricion�rio (DAC), pelas quais usu�rios n�o administrativos podem Em seus sistemas UNIX tradicionais, as prote��es do DAC incluem permiss�es de arquivos e listas de controle de acesso, e as prote��es MAC incluem controles de processo que impedem a depura��o entre usu�rios e firewalls.Uma variedade de pol�ticas MAC foram formuladas por projetistas de sistemas operacionais e pesquisas de seguran�a. incluindo a pol�tica de confidencialidade Multi-Level Security (MLS), a pol�tica de integridade Biba, RBAC (Role-Based Access Control), DTE (Domain and Type Enforcement) e TE (Type Enforcement), cada modelo baseia as decis�es numa variedade de fatores. , incluindo identidade de usu�rio, fun��o e autoriza��o de seguran�a, bem como etiquetas de seguran�a em objetos que representam conceitos como integridade e sensibilidade de dados.
	The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is capable of supporting policy modules that implement all of these policies, as well as a broad class of system hardening policies, which may use existing security attributes, such as user and group IDs, as well as extended attributes on files, and other system properties. In addition, despite the name, the MAC Framework can also be used to implement purely discretionary policies, as policy modules are given substantial flexibility in how they authorize protections.	O TrustedBSD MAC Framework � capaz de suportar m�dulos de pol�ticas que implementam todas essas pol�ticas, bem como uma ampla classe de pol�ticas de prote��o do sistema, que podem usar atributos de seguran�a existentes, como IDs de usu�rios e grupos, bem como atributos estendidos em arquivos e outras propriedades do sistema Al�m disso, apesar do nome, o MAC Framework tamb�m pode ser usado para implementar pol�ticas puramente discricion�rias, uma vez que os m�dulos de pol�ticas recebem uma flexibilidade substancial na forma como autorizam prote��es "
	MAC Framework Kernel Architecture	Arquitetura do Kernel do MAC Framework
	The TrustedBSD MAC Framework permits kernel modules to extend the operating system security policy, as well as providing infrastructure functionality required by many access control modules. If multiple policies are simultaneously loaded, the MAC Framework will usefully (for some definition of useful) compose the results of the policies.	O TrustedBSD MAC Framework permite que os m�dulos do kernel estendam a pol�tica de seguran�a do sistema operacional, bem como fornecem a funcionalidade de infra-estrutura requerida por muitos m�dulos de controle de acesso. Se v�rias pol�ticas forem carregadas simultaneamente, o MAC Framework utilizar� (para alguma defini��o �til) resultados das pol�ticas "
	Kernel Elements	Elementos do Kernel
	The MAC Framework contains a number of kernel elements:	O MAC Framework cont�m v�rios elementos do kernel: